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[L.A. No. 20183.

In Bank.

Feb. 28. 1949.]

JACK GORDON, R.e.<;pondent, v. AZTEC BREWING
COMPANY (a Corporation),. Appellant.
[IJ Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Bursting of Bottle.-Wbere
a bottle containing liquid under pressure explodes causing
injury, the person injured is entitled to the benefit of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference that the
bottler was negligt'nt, either in excessively charging the
liquid or in fniling to discover a flaw in the bottle, if it is
probable under the evidence that· it was negligent in either
respect.
[2] Id.-lnstructionB-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-In a purchaser's action
against a bottling conlpany for personal injuries sustained
when a bottle of beverage exploded, an instruction on res
ipsa loquitur was warranted where the evidence tended to
show that defendant was negligent in failing to make any of
the standard tests for the detection of flaws in the bottlea
it distributed.
[3J Id.- Rea Ipsa Loquitur - Control of IJistrumentality.- The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied only where the
instrumentality causing the injury was subject to the control
of the defendant.
[4] Id.-Bes Ipsa Loquitur-Bursting of Bottle.-In a purchaser's
action against a bottling company for personal injuries sustained when a bottle of beverage explod2d, while evidence
that the case containing the bottle suffered no damage at any
stage of its transportation from defendant's plant, that it was
[3] See 19 Cal.Jut. 708 i 38 Am.Jur. 989.
McK. Dig. Rcferenccs: [1,4] Necligence, § 138(3); [2,5] Neglig'·W·t·, § 1!)8(2); [3] Nl!gligl!nce, § 136; [6J Appehl and Error,
§ 1Ij:10; (7,81 N('glig'!'ll\'e, § 249(5); [9] Corporations, ~ 5; (10]
Corpul'utions, ~ Ii; lH, 12J Corporlltions, § 8.
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ship, and that the business continued as before, . with the
partners being the same persons all the stockholders in the
corporation, it was proper to instruct that the corporation
WI1S the alfer ego of the partnership, and that if one was liable,
both were tiable.
[10] ld.- Disregard of Oorporate };ntit~ - When Proper.- Tho
courts will refuse to recognize the fiction of separate corporAte
e:ristenee where to do 80 would foster an injustice or further
a fraud.
[11] Id.-Disregard of Oorporate Entit7-Pleading.-In a purchnll8r'1I action against a bottling corporation for perlion:ll
injunell sustained when a bottlc of bevernge exploded, wher"
dc:£endant denied that it WA.'1 engaged in the bUliine~ of
bottling, seIJing and distributing the beverllge at any time
mentioned in the complaint, but maintained that a partuer..hip
of the sa.m.e name had done so, the question of which entity
manufactured the beverage and was responsible for the safety
of its contaiuers, was thereby auftl.cientl~ raised.
[12J ld.-Disregard of Oorporate Entit~-Pler.diDg.-In a purchaser'1I action against a· bottling corporation, even it the
pleadings were deficient in rwing the issue that the corporation was the aller ,go of a partnership of the same name,
defendant was not misled to ita prejudice by any varil1nce
between the pIlladings and the proof where it maint:tined
throughout the trinl that the liabilities of the partDer~hip
eonld not be fastened on the corporation.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Roy V. Rhodes, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained when a
bottle of beverage exploded. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
I

Eugene S. Ives and Schell & Delamer for Appellant.
Mitchell" Gold, Samuel A. Rosenthal and Leonard G.
Ratner for Respondent.
SHENK, J .-This is an aetion arising out of injuries suffered when a bottle of beer exploded.
The plaintiil operated a caf6 in the city of Los Angeles.
He was transferring a bottle of ABC beer, a product of the
defendant, from its case to an icebox in his cafe when the
bottle exploded in his hand, resulting in blindness in hi"
right eye. The defendant was the bottler. From a judgment
on a verdict in favor of the plaintiff the defendant appeals.
The first question to be determined is whether on the facts
prCl:lentt.>Ci the plaintiff was entitled to an instruction on the
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part, tieular instruction given by the trial court was prejudicially

. ,In E,eola v. Ooca Cola Bottling Oo~1. 24 Ca1.2d 453 [150
436], it was pointed out that a sound bottle of carbonated
does not ordinarily explode if it is cRrefully handled.
Where a bottle containing liquid under pressure docs
I.Jxploae causing injury the plaintiff is entitled to the bt'Qcllt
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference
the bottler Willi negligent, either in excesI!ive1y charging
liquid or in failing to discover a fiaw' in the bottle, if it
probable under the evidence that the defendant was negliin either respect.
Here there was evidence tending to show the defendant
•. Ji:egligl~nt in failing to make any of the standard test.<; for the
E:iil~tiectiion of flaws in the bottles it distributed. New and u~d
were subjected only to a pasteurization process delligned
"'ii"'ln,,~.,I.., to arrest fermentation, not' to reveal weakne~l~l.
expert having long experience in the manufacture of glns.o;
glass bottles testified that the pasteurization proce.~ wa.'I
. a satisfactory teHt for strains, thin walls or small stonflll
glass. He stated that manufacturers ordinarily sub.iect
.·JIJIIJlol>J.t:III to three tests, the polariscope test, the hammer test,
the hot and cold plunge test. Thl'se tests if properly made
. said to disclose all defects. None was utilized by the
There was no showing that their use would have
impracticable or the cost prohibitive. The defendant'!'
to make sueb tests is emphasized by the fact that bottle.<; of
were known to explode during pasteurization and
°'-fl:ar,W8.l'd during transportation. A sufficiently satisfactory
of probable negligence on the part of the defendant
therefore made to warrant an instruction on res ipsa
~uiitnr.

The doctrine may be applied, however, only where the
causing the injury was subject to the control
defendant. In the Escola case this court rejected the
~~]llte]ltiClln that the instrumentality must have been in the
po8BeS1!Jion of the defendant at the time of the accident. It
.there stated: "Many authorities state that the happening
. accident does not speak for itself where it took place
. time after defendant had relinquished control of the
Mllm4entalit;y causing the injury. Under the more logical
however, ,the doctrine may be applied upon the theory
defeJidant had control at the time of the alleged neglig:ent
~rwtDel!ltali
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/1"t. nltnongh nIlt at th~ time of fbI' n,.,.idf'nt, prmi;"-r,:l plainHI1'
lir~t Pl"VW that fh~ '!('ll(lition of ' the instrumentality had Ilut

nrtl'r it left the def('ndant's possession," While
the Escola ca:;;c differs from the present case in that tJlere the
dcf~·ndant bottler had itself ddiv(~rcd the faulty buttle to
the plaintiff's employer the principll's laid down govern the
CR!':E' here. It was then declarcd thnt a plaintiff ~ay rely on
the doctrine of res ipRa loquitur "if there i~ ('vidence p,.rmitting a reasonable inference that it [the explodt·d bottle]
was not accessible to extraneous harmful forces and that it
was carefully handled by plaintiff or any third person who may
have moved or touched it." (Racola v. Ooca Oola Bottling Co.,
supra, 24 Cal.2d 453,458.)
[4] Tracing the case containing the bottle which exploded
from the defendant's plant to his hand the plainti1f introduced evidence to the e1fect that it su1fered no. damage at
any stage of its transportation. The course of cases of ABO
beer in August of 1944 when the accident occurred was as
follows: The cases were loaded on trucks of the La Salle
Trucking Company at the defendant's San Diego plant; La
Salle drivers delivered them to a warehouse of the Associated
Brewers Distributing Company in Los Angeles where they
remained about three days; on August 22 the case which
contained the bottle that exploded was delivered by an
Associated driver to the plaintiff. Evidence was presented
which showed that La Salle trucks were not involved in
accidents during August, 1944; that no accidents occurred in
the Associated warehouse that month which might have
affected the beer; that the driver who delivered the case to
the plainti1f was not involved in an accident en route and did
not bump the case; that it was in excellent condition Dn_ ... _____ ...
delivery, and that the plainti1f handled the case and bottle
carefully. While this evidence was not conclusive it was the
jury's province to determine, after being properly inStructed,
whether the plainti1f had sutHciently proved the abscnce
of intervening harmful forces after the defendant shipped
the bottle to entitle the plainti1f to rely on an inference
inherent in the doctrine that the defendant'8 lack of care
was the proximate cause of his injury.
[5] But it is contended by the defendant that even if
it be assumed that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was correctly invoked the court committed prejudical error in an
instruction on the subject. The following instnlction is
claimed to be erroneous and to require a reversal: "From
[,1'/011 dl1l1lgt'd
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. .the happening of the accident involved in this case, as
established by the evidence, there arises an,. inference that
the proximate cause of the occurrence was some negligent
eonduct on the part of the defendant. That inference i~ a
lorm of evidence, and if there is none other tending to overit, or if the inference preponderates over contrary eviit warrants a verdict for the plaintiff. Therefore you
weigh any evidence tending to overcomo that inference.
1l!1'wl:rin.tl in mind that it is incumbent upon the defend:mt to
the inference by showing that it did, in fact, exercise
care and diligence or that the accident occurred
........to:nnTIT. being proximately caused by any failure of duty on
part." Standing alone this instruction was erroneous for
omitted reference to the fact that before the jury may
.............~-" the plaintiff the benefit of the res ipsa loquitur inferencE'
believe that the bottle did not suffer damage at the
.~..._,_' of persons other than the defendant.
In determining the propriety of an instruction the
mrielVin.$t court should examine the charge as a' whole. (Wel13
21 CaUd 452, 458 [132 P.2d 471] ; Douglas v. SouthBy. Co., 203 Cal. 390, 396 [264 P. 237].) If when
I~Dnside:red together the instructions are found generally to
. the applicable law. reversible error is not necessarily
even though an isolated instruction is defective in
. 'containing all of the essential elements. (Westover v. City
Angeles, 20 Cal.2d 635, 637 [128 P.2d 350] ; CaUet v.
210 Cal. 65, 70 [290 P. 438J.)
. After the above instruction was given, the court went
" charge: "The instruction just given may appear to
I18tiitn1te an exceptiop to the general rule that the mere
pp'enlng of an accident does not support an inference of
The instruction, however, is based on a special
of the law which may be applied only under special
i'PM,m ..tAn,t...., they being as follows: FirSt: the fact that some
lBtl:'UDlien1:ality. by which the injury to the plaintiff was
caused, was in the possession and under the
DltcllllSi've control of the defendant at the time the cause of the
1J''i1,.;.,,_ was set in motion. . . . A defendant is deemed to
.control at the time of the alleged negligent act although
at the time of the accident, provided plaintiff first proves
. the condition of the instrnmentality had not been changed
. it left the defendant's possession. The defendant is not
with the duty of showing that something happened
. bottle after it left its control and management. III
&'. ____• •
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order to be entitled to the bellefit of LiJt! doctrine of relS ip~a
loquitur, the plaintiif must show that every person who moved
or touched the bottle after it left the control of the deff>nc1nnt.
did 80 with due care, and that during said time tht' botth' wus
not accessible to extraneous harmful forces."
Thus the broad instruction on res ipsa loquitur was follow,·.1
by qualifying instructions explaining the circumstanc(·s whi,·I.
must be present before the inference of negligence NLn IIri".. .
including a charge that the plaintiif must prove that all wi .. .
dealt with the bottle beside the defendant did 80 with du(> carl'.
It is therefore apparent that taken together the entire char;!t·
on the subject fairly presented to the jury the element "r'
careful handling and that the erroneous omission of tlllll
element from the general instruction was not prejudicial.
(See Westover v. Oity of Lo. Angele., supra, 20 Cal.2d 635,
637~39; Jucherl v. Oalifornia Water Service 00., 16 Cal.2d
500, 513-15 [106 P.2d 886] ; Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206.
216-18 [291 P. 173] ; McOhristian v. Popkin, 75 CaI.App.2c1
249, 257-58 [171 P.2d 85] ; Bar.ha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
32 Cal.App.2d 556, 565 [90 P.2d 371].)
[8] For still another reason the defendant's attempt hi
show reversible error must fail. Apart from instructionl! CIt I
res ipsa loquitur, instructions on general ru1es governin,.:
liability for negligence were given. The jury was instructt't1
that the burden was upon the plaintiff to prove by a prl"
ponderance of evidence that the defendant was riegligent al111
that his negligence was a proximate cause of the injury. Therl'
was present in this case a strong showing of negligence in
the defendant's failure to test the bottles before distributin!!
them to the public where they might cause harm if defective.
There was also evidence to refute the possibility of intervenin:,!
damage to the bottle. Under these circumstances the instruction on res ipsa loquitur, even if erroneous, did not result in
a miscarriage of justice, for it is highly improbable that the
jury found in the plaintiif's favor without concluding that
the defendant was negligent and that the bottle was carefuU:,'
handled after the defendant parted with it. (Gerdes v. Pacific Gas ct Electric 00., 219 Cal. 459, 471 [27 P.2d 365, 90
A.L.R. 1071] ; Junge v. Midland Oounties etc. Corp., 38 Cal.
App.2d 154, 160 [100 P.2d 1073]; Gonzalez v. Nichols, 110
Cal.App. 738, 741-42 (294 P. 7581.)
This action was prosecuted against the defendant corporation only and it is contended that any cause of action for
injuries resu1ting from defects in ABC beer bottles, which
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the date of plaintiff 's i~j\lry should have been brought
the Aztec Brewing Company, a partnership, and not
Brewing Company, a corporation. It appears that the
did not ll'arn the details of the defendant's structure
.its relationship to the partnership until the action against
Y,CJ""uucun corporation had proceeded to trial. When thes(!
.• were disclosed the plaintiff decided to proceed against
1f(,(lL(U'~lnIAIJU, corporation instead of the partnership on the
that one was the alter ego of the other.
is no conflict in the evidence on this question. The
. ;Brewing Company, a corporation, wa., organized in
, and thereafter engaged in tho manufacture and sale of
. beer. In March, 1944, the company's structure was
to a partnership for tax reasons. All of the corpora·
"property was transferred to the partnership and the
continued as before, the partnership assuming with·
the manufacturing, bottling and selling of
beer. The partners were the same persons as the stock·
in the corporation. They acquired and retained the
'proportional interest in the partnership as they had had
, corporate stock. The president and viee.president of
~:i!rOl']pol~atiion became general partners in the new partner·
the other former stockholders became' limited
The name, Aztec Brewing Company, was retained
license procured to sell beer under that name. The part.
.
continued to employ the same personnel and use the
.. jnanufacturing plant and offices. No changes were
.in: labels, packing cases, letterheads or invoices. ., The
ft\1otj!'~tio'n was not dissolved, however, but remained in
to collect debts owed it, continuing for a short time
offices of its successor. Checks of the corporation
.
were differentiated by the addition of the
. corporation" or " a partnership" after the name,
'Brewing Company.
On the basis of these facts the trial court instrnctcd
. celt has been established in this case that A1.tec
Company, a corporation, is the 'alter ego or other
the Aztec Brewing Company, a copartnership. There·
fl one is liable, both are liable." A verdict in the
IintnP".·, favor was returned against the corporation lind
Ll'tiIl'ershin and' a judgment entered against both.
defendant contends that the relationship of altef' ego
.established 8S a matter of law and that the in.~rU.:tioJl
eifectwBS improper. A similar case was decided by

.'g&lI1S1
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the Supreme Court of: the State ot' Washington in Associated
Oil Co. v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 172 Wash. 204 r19 P.2d 940].
Suit was brought. against the Seiberling Rubber Company,
an Ohio corporation, to recover on a guaranty alleged to have
been executed by the defendant. In the written guaranty,
the guarantor was described as Seiberling Rubber Company,
a D~Iaware corporation, and the guaranty was signed "Seiberling Rubber Company. tt After the answer was filed the
plaintiff discovered for the first time that there were two
corporationl'l closely allied, the de!cnd:mtOhio corporation,
ann It Delaware corporat.ion havin~ the snme name. It wac;
found that the Delaware corporation owned all the stock of
the Ohio corporation, that their officers were identical, and
that the business affairs of the two corporations were conducted
from the same offices. Because of the similarity in names and
commingling of business the Washington Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff was entitled to t.reat the two corporations as
a sin~lc ('ntity, and thus recover from the defendant, although
it bad not signed the note, since the confusion of the two
identities resulted in probable fraud upon third persons dealing with the corporations, whether or not actual fraud was
intended. Related also to this case is our d"cision in Marabito
v. San Franc1.3co Dairy Co., 1 Ca1.2d 400 [35 P.2d 513], in
which a truck bearing the name of the defendant San Francisco Dairy Company struck the plaintiff. It was urged that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict against the
deff'ndant since it was merely a nonoperating subsidiary of
the Dairy Delivery Company which carried on the business.
The officers of both companies were the same. This court held
ibatthe only logical conclusion was that the San Francisco
Dairy Company was1the alter ego of the Dairy Delivery Company and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict
against the San Francisco Dairy Company. Subsequently an
order adding to the judgment the name of the Dairy Delivery
Company as the real defendant was sustained. (Marabito v.
San Francisco Dairy Co., 8 Cal.App.2d 54 [47 P.2d 5301.)
That these decisions involve two corporations and not a
corporation and partnership as in the case before us does
not lessen their significance for the same principles apply.
[10] The cases mentioned illustrate in a factual context
similar to that before us the rule that where the recognition
of the fiction of separate corporate existence would foster an
injustice or further a fraud the courts will refuse to recognize
it. (8tark v. Coker, 20 Ca1.2d 839,846 [129 P.2d 390j ; Puccetft
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v. Girola,20 CaJ.2d 574,578 [128 P . 2d 13J; Shea v. Leonis,
14 Cal.2d 666, 669 [96 P.2d 332J.) It is not necessary that
the plaintiff prove actual fraud. It is enough if'the recognition
of the two entities as separate woul<l result in an injustice.
(Wellban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 698 [227 P.
7231; Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 488 [202 P. 673].)
[9b] Here confusion would be promoted and an unjust result
be accomplished if the maintenance of the two entities controlled by the same persons and having an identical name were
permitted to frustrate a meritorious claim. Since thE' evidence
on this qnestion was not contradi('ted th('rc was no issne of
fact requiring submission to the jury and the trial court's determination that as a matter of law.the corporate defendant
was the alter ego of the partnership must be sustained.
[11] It is contended by the defendant that the issue of
whether there existed an alter ego relationship was not pleadcd
Hnd was therefore not before the trial court. Defects in the
complaint may be cured by allegations of the answer. (Vaughn
v. Jonas, 31 Cal.2d 586. 603-04 [191 P.2d 4321; Hariman
Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 248-49 [73
P.2d 11631; 1I1arr v. Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal.App.
2d 673,680-81 [105 P.2d 649].) In its answer the defendant
denied that it was engaged in the business of bottling, selling
and distributing ABC beer at any time mentioned in the complaint. The question of which entity manufactured the becr
and was responsible for the safety of its containers, was
!, thereby sufficiently raised.
[12] Furthermore, even if the
pleadings were to be considered deficient in tbis respect, it is
t ' clear tbat the defendant ;has not heen,misled to its prejudice
1. by any variance between pleadings and proot (Code Civ.
r: Proc., § 469.) From the beginning of the proceedings it WitS
:- prepared to maintain, and did maintain throughout the trial,
i. tbnt the liabilities of the partnership could not be tnstened
f' upon the corporation.
,
~ The judgment is affirmed.
r:c
:."

Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer, J ., and Spence, .J .,
~ concurred.

i"

k
~,

. TRAYNOR,

J.-I conC'ur in the judgment.
It is my opinion that the evidence in this case does not

twarrant the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
k~nd that if defendant's liability is predicated on negligence
i;ri;,
'\

~'.
i
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the instructions on res ipsa loquitur l are prejudicially erroneous even though there is evidence that would support the
verdict independently of that doctrine.
The luajority opinion jUlitifics these instructions on the
gruunds that there W8lJ evidence of negligence on the part
of ddendant and enough evidence to warrant an infcr('nce
tln,t there was no change in the condition of the bottll' art('r ,
lThe jUl'1 wu iDatrueted u followl:
.
• • From the happeniug of the accident involvod in tbil case, BII eatab·
lishod b,. the evidence, there arilel au inference that the pronmate enuso
of tbe occurrence waa lOIIIe negligent conduct on the part of dcfond:l1lt.
That inference is a form of evidence, and if there is none otber tending
to overthrow it, or if the inferenue. preponderatea over contral'1 evidence,
it wal'l'lUlts a verdict for the plnintiif. Theretore, you should weigh
evidence tending to overeome that inference, belLriug in mind thnt it iI
incumbent upon the detendant to rebut the intereneo by sho,dng that it
did, in fact, exercise ordinar;y care and diligence or tllat tbe nCC!idC'nt
oc:currod with"ut being proximatel,. Mused by an,. iniluro o~ dllty on lts-

lUI,.

pnrL

.., ... -.---.------

)

.

• •In mn.king such a showing, it ill not n"OOStIal'1 for a dct,'ud:1nt to
overcome the inference b;y a prcponder:mce of the evidenco. Phintiff'l
burden of proving negligence b,. n preponderance ot the evideneo ill not·
ch:mgcd by the mle just mentioned. It follows, thurefore, tbn.t in oMI'r
to hold the dufl'ndA.nt Ii:\ble, the inference of negligence lJl1¥lt hRvo grt'lltC'r
wdght, more convincing force in thfl mind of the jul'1. than the OPPOIIing
cxpJ:Ul:\tion oifered by the defendant.
.. If .lIuch a preponderance in plaintilf's favor enats, then it must be
found that some negligent conduct on the po l't of defendant WIUI a pruxi·
m:lte c:\use ot the injur;y; but if it dOel not exist, if the evidence prepon·
del:\te!I in defendant's favor, or if in the jul'1'S mind there il an even
b:t1:meo u between the weight of the biterence and the weight of the
r.olltrnl'1 explanation, neither having the more collvincing foree, then the
vf)r(lict must be for the defendant•
•• The instruction just given may appear to cunstitute an exception to
the general rule that the mere happening of an accident does not support
-iln 4nttlrenee of negligence. The Inltruction, however, iI baaed on a special doctrine of the law whie" rna,. be applied onl;y UDder Ipecial cireum·
lItancCl, the;y being as follows:
"First: The fact that some certain instrumentalit;y, by which injUl'1
to the plaiuti1! was proximately caused, wu in the poneasion and under
the ..xelusive control of the deteDdnnt at the time the caun of injur;y
was RUt in motion, it appenring on the tace of the event that the injUl'1
wns cauaed b;y Rome act or omission incident to defendant'l management.
•• Second: The fact thllt the accident was one of such nature u dose
not bappen in the ordin:\r;y course of things, if those who have control
ot the bl"trumcnt:llity use ordinal'1 c,'lre. •.•
.. A defendant. is deemed to have had control ot an iDatrumenmlity
where it hnd eontrol at the time of the alleged negligent act although
not at the time of the accident, provided plaintiif first provCl that the
condition ot the instrumentalit;y had not been changed after it left defenitant's ponession.
.
•• The detendant is not charged With the dut,. of showing that something happened to the bottle after it left ita control and management. In
order to be entitled to the benefit of the doctrine ot rei ipsa loquitur, the
pL'lintiif must show that evel'1 person who moved or touched the bottle
nft,-r it left tlle control of detendant. did so with due care, and thnt duro
iA, Aid time the bottle W:l1I not accenible to utraneoUi harmful tore. . JJ

Feb. 1949]

)

)

GoRDON tI. AZTEC BREWING
(33 C.Jd 111.; 203 P.Jd 02]

Co.

525

defendant relinquished control of it. In my opinion tbe instructions cannot be justified on either ground.
In support of the first ground the majority opinion adduces
the evidence that defendant did not apply the standarci teRlIt
U1ted by bottle manufacturers to aseertain if bottles are free
of defects, together with the evidence that bottles frequently
broke at the brewery and during' their· transportation thereafter. The majority opinion thus invokes evidence of defendant's conduct and the quality of his bottles to justify an
instruction that negligence may be inferred, not from such
evidence, but from the occurrence of the accident itself. The
npplication of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur depends, however, on the nature of the accident and on whether defendant
had exclusive control of the bottle at the time the cause of
injury was set in motion. Evidence regarding defendant's
bottling procedure is immaterial since the inferences are to
be drawn solely from the occurrence of the accident and defendant'scontrol; if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not
already applicable such evidence does not render it so.
In support of the contention that the bottle was carefully
handled and was not accessible to any extraneous harmful
forces after leaving the brewery, plaintiff introduced evidenee that the truck that carried the beer to Los Angeles had
not been in any accident, that the manager of the company
that distributed the beer did not know of any accident in the
distributing company '. warehouse, that the truck that delivered the beer to plaintiff pad not been in any accident, that
,the man who delivered the beer to plaintiff handled the
bottles carefully and observed that -the eases appeared to be
1tt excellent condition, and that the beer was handled carefully
by plaintiff. The manager of the distributing company called
is a witness for plaintiff, testified as follows:
-~r"Q. During the time ... [that the bottle was in the warehouse] were you aware of any accident occurring at your
warehouse that affected these bottles of beer in any way'
';a\;; None whatsoever.
:{ "Q. If there is any accident in your warehouse or in '
tour plant which would cause breakage of bottles does that
'fac~o the men in your employ, do they bring this infor'lbntion to you! A. Well, they don't, not necessarily, because
in handling bottled goods, merchandise, like beer, if it is not
handled properly it would cause breakage; in other words,
if our men taking the beer oft the atacka, oft the conveyors,
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and putting it in stacks, when they have to go up sp.""n high
nr l'Iix high, in just loading it on there, they Ilsed too much
force, the force inside would cause two bottles to bump against
each other and the chances are a bottle would break.
c, Q. All right, now then, when there is such breakage
oceurring do your men make reports of this breakage to you'
A. No, not necessarily.
ceQ. What happens when this breakage occurs; do you just
simply stack that ease aside' A. No, we put that case aside.
cc Q. And do you salvage itt A. We salvage the goods or
put in another bottle. If it is just one bottle we just take out
the glass and put another full bottle in.
ceQ. During •.. [the time that the bottle was in the warehouse] Jidyou personally have any knowledge as to whether
some of the cases had any broken bottles of beer in them,
that is, the ABC cases' A. There ian't any time that
there isn't a bottle or two broken to the (!fiRe. Therc is always
soml'thing broken on account of handling of it.
ccQ. You mean handling it at your warehouse' A. Our
warehouse, or handling it at the loading of the truck at the
brewcry, or it can happen anywhere."
The foregoing evidence regarding the ha.ndling of the bottle
arter it left defendant's brewery, fails to prove that the bottll'
W8.<S not subject to extraneou.'5 harmful forces; in fact it
proves just the contrary. There iR no indication that the handling that broke mauy bott.les fcc There isn't any time that
therc ian't a bottle or two broken to the case. There is always
something broken on account of handling of it. "] didnot also
weaken others enough to mak~ them dangerons.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is based on probabilities.
The nature of the injury together with defendant's control
must be such that reasonable men can conclude it is more
probable than not that the cause of the injury was negligent
conduct on the part of defendant. (La Porte v. Houston,
ante, pp. 167, 169 [199 P.2d 665] ; Honea v. Oity Dairy, Inc.,
22 Cal.2d 614, 616-617 [140 P.2d 369] : Binds 'V. Wkeadon,
19 Cal.2d 458, 461 [121 P.2d 724] ; see Prosser, Torts, p. 297.)
Reasoning solely from the occurrence of the accident and the
evidence of what happened to the bottle after it left defendant's control, one cannot conclude it is more probable than
not that the bottle broke because of defendant's negligence.
for it is at least as probable that the bottle broke because of
handling by the distributor as that it broke because of some
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defect existent when defendant relinquished control.·
The evidence that defendant did not test its bottles and
that lUany broke or exploded at the brewery aud during their
tran;o:portation thereafter iii !'Iufficient to warrllUt n finding t.hat
Jefcndant was n\."gligently relca.o:ing dangerous and defeetiYe
bottJc~ on the market. The jury eould reasonably conclude,
therefore, t.hat plaintiff'R injury was caused by defendant '!II
negligence in releasing such bottles. NevertheleSR, the fact
that there is some support for the verdict in the evidenct'
2The error of giving iJ18tructionl on l'eII ipsa loquitur Wall aggravnted
II), the language of the iDatruCtiODl as is noted by the opinion of Presiding
.JDltice Shinn for the Distriet Court of Appeal, Second District, Divillion
Three, which reversed the judgment in this cue. •• By this instruction
the court withdrew from the jury two essential questions of fact, namely,
whether plaintiff hnd estnblillhed by his evidence that the bottle WIlS
probably not rendered unsnfo while it was in the hRnds of other persons
after it left possession of tho defend:lnt, and' whether the defective or
dttngerous condition of the bottle would probably have been discovered
,by defendant in the exercise of ordinary care•..•
II The first sentence of the questioned iDltruction [quoted in note I,
""ra] can be interpreted only as a direction to the jury that, as a matter
of law, under the facts as established by the evidence, the res ipsa loquitur
inference of negligence was applicable to the defendant; and the suc·
eOciding two lIentl1nees limited the duty of the jury to weighing thial
inference agninst any contrary evidence. This instruction would have
b",cn prol,.,r on:!,. if the mere bursting of the bottle raised an inference
th:1t 1I0muone had boen negligent, and also if it had been proved by clenr
udllDcontrl1.dicted evidence thnt the bottle had been carefully handled
by all 1'IlrBOns who hnd poslIe!lllion of it, and that it WIlS not exposed to
injury, nlter it left thE' h:uu\.q of the bottler. The bunting ot the hottle
did not rnlse un inferenCtl of negligence. However, in view of the IIncon. tradicted testimony that the beer bottle was carefully handled by plainl'
~tii!, the explosion in it.8elf jUAtified lin inference that, when delivered
,',to plnintiff, the bottle wascit.her_4Ilfcet,i.!."U~.1"nnder .exeellllive internrul
·"'pres.cmre, for, na s:dd in ~e Es('ol" ~"'" • lIo'l1nd ttnd properly prepnrcd
I
~bottlcs of enrbonated liquids do Dot ordinRrily flxplode when cnl'efully
'handled.' (24 Cnl.2d 453, 4;'9 [laO P.2d 436].) As we baveseen, the
expert ~timon,. WILl to be weighed with the evidence of the metbods
'~nnployed by clef<mdant in determining whether the inference aro!le that
'defendant h:ld been negligent. The instmetion took thil! iS811e from the
jury ancl W!L8 projudicin1ly erroneous.
l~" "Moreover, whether this clungerous condition of the bottle develope.l
""while it WlUI in POlls(''85ion of tho defend:lUt, rnthcr than one of tho int.~r·
'in...1iate parties \"ho hnndlcd it, prc.qcnted a question 01 fact 11.8 to th(l
.(,manner in whieh it Wall hnndled by these latter nersons. We ('oItnllot say
...,tla:lt !he jury eould not have re:tSonably found- that the evidence was
~i~",~mcient to {lrove that the bottle was carcfully hllndlud, Ilnd waR not
~ IIl1bJoctcd to tlnmneOlll! harmful forcCII after it left defenruwt '. control.
~iB7 taking thisnttditional issue of fact from the jur)', tho foregoing in·
~~1I'tion wns ltg'lin prejnclici:ll to (jefendRnt.
}~ "PL'1intilr, bowever, r"fers to the estnblished rllie that in .letermining
.. the {lroprit·ty of instmctions, tlley ml\st be consiilered all a whole (Crool;8
'W1cite. 101 Ca1.App. 304, 312 [290 P. 491]), and maiutttlJllltbnt this
~:!Utditional error in the qnoted instruction WIlS cured by other inst,ruction!'
~ which followed it. The record shOWI that the court ltated to the jury
'I:
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independent of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not
render the erroneous instructions harmless. The effect of adding these instructions to those on the general rules goveminJ!
liability for negligence is to offer the jury two alternative
routes'to a verdict for plaintiff. Under general instructions
on negligence the jury must decide whether plaintiff htls
discharged his burden of proving that defendant was negligent and if so, whether that negligence was the cause of tho
injury. Under the res ipsa loquitur instructions the jury
could conclude that this burden was discharged by an inference arising from the occurrence of the accident, even if they
found that plaintiff's evidence of defendant's bottling procedure fell short of discharging plaintiff's burden of proving
negligence. They were also presented with a very close question as to whether the bottle was defective when defendant
relinquished control or developed a defect thereafter. Had it
not been for the res ipsa loquitur instructions it is not improbable that they would have concluded that plaintiff had
tlmtthe inference of negligence referred to in the quoted instruction
W:l.l! applie4ble only under certain speeial circumstances, one of whi('h
W38 tlmt tho instruuwntality causing the injury • was in the posse88iun
nnd undor tho exclusive control of the dcfendnnt a.t the time tho causo
t)f tho injury was set in motion. I The court then gave the following illstructions: • A dcfendnnt is deemed to have control of an instrument:ility
where it llad control at the time of the alleged negligent Ret although
not at the time of the accident, provided plaintiff first prove thnt tho
condition of the iDstrumentality had not been changed after it left tho
dofCUflnnt's p088eBBion. The defendant is not charged with the duty of
showing that 80mething happoned to the bottlo after it left its control
and management. In ordttr to be entitled to the bonefit of the doctrine
of lCII ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must show that every person who moved
or touchod the bottle after it left tho control of the defendant, did 80
with due care, and that durin*, said time the bottle was not aeeessiblo
to extraneous harmful foreos.' It is to bo noted that nowbere in those
later instructions did the court direct the j1ll7 that it must find tho indicated facts to be true before the supposed inferenco of negligence might
bo appliod to defendant. Plaintiff's contention that these later instructions did submit the issue of careful handling to the jury is lUI insufficient answor, for so construed, they would be in direct confiiet with the
previous. instruction which, as we have seen, took that issue from tho
jury. It is well settlod that reversiblo error in the form of erronoous
instructions cannot be cured by giving other correct instructions, whoro
the effect is to create a clear eonfiict, and it is imposaible to determine
'fbich instructions governed the jury's determina.tion. (Wright v. 8ftif!en, flO Cal.A.pp.2d 858, 868 [181 P.2d 675]; !lOI. v. Baldwift, '" CAl.
Al'P.l:!d 433, 486 [112 P.2d 666]; ,flee,.. v. Cowaft, 26 Cal.App.2d 694.
699 [1110 P.2d 148].) The two sets of instructions m&7 be rceoncilod,
but only 00 the theory that the court was informing ~e jury thAt. AI
1\ matter of law, the prerequisite fact of 811bsequcnt e.'U'oful handling
nftu the bottle left defendant's control. had beon conclusively 88ta.b. lisbed. Under this view, the additional error in the original instruction
WDII clearly not cured by the later instrUctions, but was actually emphasized and further impressed upon the minds of the jury."
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not discharged his burden of proving that defendant's negligence was the cause of the' injury.
Whether the giving of inst.ructions on res ipsa loquitur
when that doctrine is not 'applicable is pr~judicial, if the
evidence is sufficient to support the verdict independently
of the doctrine, depends on the particular facts of the cwre.
In Gerda v. Pacific Gas ~ Electric Co., 219 Cal. 459 [27 P.2d
365, 90 A.L.R. 1071], the only issue was whether defendant
WIlS negligent in not repairing a broken gas line or shutting
off the gas with sufficient promptness after being informed
of a cave-in decting its pipes. The court held that the giving
of a res ipsa loquitur instruction was not prejudicial becau.qe
it could not "be presumed that the jury may have believed
that said company was free from negligence in this particular,
but nevertheless returned a verdict against it, although the
evidence as a matter of law clearly showed the company to
be free from negligence in all other respects." (219 Cal. at
471.) The evidence was clear as to when defendant was notified of the cave-in, and there Wa.Il no dispute that the injury
w~ cnllsE'd by an explofdon of gas that escaped from defendant's linc.
In Gtnazalez v. Nichols, 110 Cal.App. 738 [294 P. 758],
plaintiiI's autoruobilc collided with defendant's truck parked
at night in a dip on the traveled part of the highway. The
rear light of the truck was obscured. There was no dispute
th:lt the truck's position was a contributing cause of the accident, and the court held that in view of the exceptionally
clear case of negligence the instruction on res ipsa loquitur
did not lead to a miscarriage of justice.···
In Junge v. MidlaM Countiu elc. Corp., 38 Cal.App.2d
154 [100 P.2d 1073], plaintUf was severely burned by contact
with a fence on which defendant's high tension electric lin~
had fallen. The break in the line had caused defendant's
automatic circuit breaker to open, thus cutting off the powcr
to the fallen line. Plaintiff was injured because defendant's
service man had repeatedly reclosed the switch in an attempt
to restore current through the line. The only issue was
whether it was negligent to reclose the switch, and there was
substantial evidence that to do 80 was contrary to the practice of well-managed power companies. The court held that
in view of the evidence of negligence the instruction on res
ipsa loquitur was not prejudicial.
In none of these cases waR there any queRtion as to what
conduct on defendant'l:; part caused the injury, and in aU
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of them there was substantial c\'idellCe thatdefendant',was
llt'g'Jigent in respect to that conduct. It is unlikely, therefore, that in any of them the jury would have found in favor
of dcfendant on the issue of whether he was negligent in
respect to such conduct and also found him liable by applyill:! reS ipsa loquitlir, When, as in this case, however, there
il' doubt as to whether defendant's conduct caused the injury
or whether it was negligent in any respect, the giving of
iustructions on res ipsa loquitur when that doctrine does not
npply is prejudidally erroneous. (Tower v. Hurnbolt Transit
Co., 17·6 Cal. 602, 607 [169 P. 227] ; Grilsch v. Pic7,wick Staaes
System, 131 Cal.App. 774, 783-785 [22 P.2d 554] ;,Ot'a'1 v. Los
..t,,'geles By. Corp., 69 Cal.App. 123, 125-126 [230 P. 970].)
By approving the res ipsa loquitur instructions given in
thi~ case, the majority opinion leaves it to the jury to hold
dllfclldant strictly liable not only for defects in its bottlt'S
when they leave its control but also for defects that develop
in the normal course of marketing procedures. If such liahility is to be impoRtld it lihould be imposed opcnly nnel not
by SPllriOUS appli('ation of rules developed to dE'termine th('
sufik·iency of eirfmmstantial e,idence in n<'{.rligenee eases.
In J<JscoZa v. Coca Cola Bottling Co .. 24 Ca1.2d 453 [150
P.2d 436], I concurred in the judgment on the ground that
a ruanufaeturer incurs an absolute liability when an article
that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to human beings. I regarded this liability as limited
to injuries that could be traced to the product as it reached
the market. There was abundant evidence in the Escola ca.Cle
that the bottle was def~ctive at the time defendant delivered
it to the restaurant where plaintiff was employed. In the present case the evidence shows that even though the bottle was
exposed to extraneous harmful forces, it was subjected to no
more than the usual wear and tear incident to normal marketing procedures and nothing unusual happened to it. Since,
however, normal handling might have caused the defect, it
cannot be inferred from the explosion alone that the bottle
WM defective when defendant relinquished control. It is
therefore necessary to decide whether the bottler's Rtrict liability extends not only to defects existing when he relinquishes
control, but also to defects t.hat arise as a result of normal
handling therpafter. The facts of t.his ease suggest. that not
uncommonly a plaintiff will be unable to trace the defect to
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the botUer lOr 10 fix 11"1,di~.·II .. I· 1111 :lily Hf tI ... fI .. 1'''"", !1':""I.,~h
whose hands thp hottl.· I'"S~S 1/1'1'",'#' l'(>adlill~ hlll1
. From the time they are rapped until they arc up('lwcl botare subject to many hazards. They are bounced and
, bumped, joggled and jostled, as they are loaded, transported,
Unloaded, refrigerated, and carried from store to home. At
'any time along this hazardous course a bottle may become
lI"f'.."t'lv" and thus a risk to those who handle it. The risk is
the consumer cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate
n,."tA,·t himself against. He does not ordinarily inspect
IFtiiOttles. and in any event it is not likely that he is qualified
latent defects. He accepts the bottle on faith. The
exl~lUIUU,ll of bottles is not such a commonplace that those
(;U,ell1,llllS with them ordinarily guard against that risk.
The reasons that make the bottler strictly liable for dein his bottles when they leave his control extend his
to defects that result from normal marketing pro"Even if there is no negligence . . . public policy
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent
products that reach the market. It is evident
the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard
rfllr&lJnst the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those
su1fer injury from defective products are unprepared
Hiii!J'meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss
or health may be 'an overwhehrling misfortune to the
HEMIn injured, and a needless one, for the risk of' injury
be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among
as a cost of doing business. It is to the public into discourage the marketing of products having defects
. are a menace to the public. If such products neverthefind their way into the market it is to the public interest
_'ft"D"" the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause
the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in
maIDU:Ia~ltu:re of the product, is responsible for its reachmarket. However intermittently such injuries may
and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of
'occurrence is a constant risk and a general one. Against
a risk there should be general and constant protection
manufacturer is best situated to aiford such protec(Concurring opinion, EscoZa v. Ooca Oola Boftling
'Cal.2d 453, 462 [150 P.2d 436].)
, bottler's duty to the public is to provide a product
'will safely withstand normal marketing procedures b.-.
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fore it reaches the consumer. lie must foresee the trl'atment
to which his bottles will be exposed in normal handling, and
if he has the responsibility for defects that arise therefrom,
he will be impelled to selec~ bottles that can withstand strain,
to pack bottles in such. a 'way as to minimize the chances of
injury to them, and to select avenues for marketing so that
they will reach the public in a safe condition. A bottle can
hardly be considered not defective if it cannot safely withstand the treatment it will normally receive in carrying ita
contents to the consumer.
•• In the food products cases the courts have resorted to
various fictions torationaIize the extension of the manufacturer's warranty to the consumer: that a warranty runs
with the chattel; that the cause of action of the dealer ill
assigned to the consumer; that the consumer is a third party
beneficiary of the manufacturer's contract with the dealer.
They have also held the manufacturer liable on a mere fiction of negligence..•. " (Concurring opinion, EscolG v. COCG
Co1G Bottli·ng Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 465-466 [150 P.2d 436].)
Similarly many courts that have not openly made the bottler
strictly liable have coupled with the doctrine of· res ipsa
loquitur a fiction that the plaintiit has proved, or at the trial
will be able to prove, that the condition of the bottle did not
change from the time it left the bottler until it exploded, with
the object of fixing liability upon the bottler. (See, e. g.,
PG'Yne v. Bome COCG-ColtJ Bottling Co., 10 Ga.App. 762 [73
S.E. 1087, 1088]; O,.tego v. Nehi Bottling Works, 199 La.
599, 605·606 [6 So.2d 677]; StoU6 v. Anheuse,.-Busck, 307
~o. 5.2(),529 [271 S.W. 497, 39 .A..L.R. 1001]; Benkenilo,.fe,.
v. GGf'f'eft, (Tex.Civ.App.), 143 S.W.2d 1020, 1023; MtJi:Pher•
• on v. CGntJda Dry Ginger Ale, ltaC., 129 N.J.L. 365, 366 [29
A.2d 868]; Mac,." v. CocG-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Mich. 567,
576-577 [287 N.W. 922] ; cf., EscoltJ v. CoCtJ Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal.2d 453,458 [150 P.2d 436]; Boffing v. COCG-CoZG Bottling Co., 87 Cal.App.2d 371,375 [197 P.2d 56].) These decisions tacitly recognize that public policy demands that the
bottler's responsibility must be measured in terms of the
normal risks attendant upon .the handling of bottled beverages. "These bottled beverages, containing explosive gases,
are put upon the market with the intention that they will be
transported throughout the country and sold to consumers
for the profit of the manufacturer. Obviously this should be
at his risk. Public policy requires that the manufacturer
should assume the risks and hazards of explosion incident to
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the reasonable and ordinarily careful handling of these goods
in the usual course of business. . .• It is fair to the manufac·
t turer, and will afford the consumer of the beverage and those
handling it in the ordinary course of trade reasonable pro;' tection, while the contrary rule leaves them practically without
\ redress." (Stolle v. Anheuser·Busch, S1tprG, 307 Mo. 520, 529.)
':;~:In the Escola case the bottler was also the distributor 80
,'that it was possible to trace the defect directly to him. A
.'. bottler cannot shift the responsibility to provide a product
, that will be safe in the hands of the consumer by routing his
'products through others. "The manufacturer's obligation to
the consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship
~bctween them; it cannot be escaped because the marketing of
.ii,product has become so complicated as to require one or more
'pltermediarips." (Concurring opinion, Escola v. COCG ColG
':Q.o~~Ung Co., 24 C"l1.2d 453, 467-468 [150 P.2d 436].)

J

.'

./ EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the conclusion of Mr. Justice
:Traynor that the instructions to the jury on the doctrine of
.;Jies ipsa loquitur were prejudicially erroneous, but I do not
:agree with the rule of strict liability stated. by him in
,:E,eoltl v. COCG CoZa Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453 [150 P .2d
'436Jf and now reiterated.
;.,' For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment.
)·a.1'::'~·

. ,' ·Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 28,
IH9. Edmonda, J., voted for a reheariJ1c.
, <~;,,';
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